The Untold Origins of the Luna Expedition: The Grand Strategy of Philip II and His Council To Secure the Indies, 1556-1559

By: David B. Dodson

November 2017

(From a lengthier manuscript compiled in 2005)

 Abstract

The 1559 Spanish expedition led by Don Tristán de Luna was only one-half of a much larger plan to protect their treasure fleets from pillaging by French corsairs. Until now, that fact has never been recognized by historians. Indeed, the blackout of information King Philip II imposed upon his North American lands purposely hid the Luna expedition from the French and English for centuries, until Señor Barcia finally revealed the settlement effort in his 1723 History of Florida. Curiously, North American scholars have likewise been blind to the 1559 South American expedition that spawned the Luna expedition. Indeed, there was actually a two- continent plan developed by the Council of the Indies in the years 1556-1557 that was set in motion in 1558-1559. It appears that historians from both sides of the equator have treated the New World of the Western Hemisphere as practically being developed in two vacuums. But the evidence is overwhelming that in the 16th century the two continents of North and South America were more of a singular and fluid entity with Spanish peoples coming and going to both continents (as well as to Asia and the Philippine Islands) as one might easily travel to visit a distant cousin. The vastnesses of the newly explored oceans were not considered a hindrance, but simply a means of transportation.

The following discussion focuses on the previously “unknown origins” of the Luna Expedition relative to securing Spanish lands and protecting the treasure fleets in both North and South America.

 

The Beginnings

In 1556 the Holy Roman Emperor and King of Spain, Charles V, abdicated his thrones and his son Philip II became king solely of Spain. The wars by Charles V against the French and their Turkish and Moorish allies had drained the coffers of Spain, even though fleets of ships were bringing back tons of silver and gold from the New World. The mines of Potosi in Peru (now Bolivia), discovered in 1544, were producing the majority of silver and gold for Spain, but the overall Spanish population in that hemisphere was miniscule. The threat of Portuguese expansion in Brazil and French Huguenot intrusion into South America threatened Spanish control of those lands. Thus, in 1556, a plan or strategy evolved whereby South American mines and ports would be protected.

The plan developed by the Council of Indies comprised of a settlement expedition that would sail from Spain to South America with soldiers and colonists to reinforce and secure four settlements around the Rio de Plata (River of Silver), which empties into the Southern Atlantic Ocean in present-day Paraguay. Further, the Council sought to fortify the ports with expensive and accurate bronze cannons with all the necessary ammunitions. The expedition would also explore for more gold and silver all the way to the Straights of Magellan at the southern tip of South America, expand the production of sugar cane, and pacify the lands, especially the cannibals.

However, there was one important problem; the Spanish Crown was bankrupt and had no funds to implement such a plan. Thus, the Council of the Indies solicited public proposals in the first half of 1557 from private consortiums in Spain to finance and implement the desires of their king. Importantly, whoever headed the expedition would also be appointed the powerful positions of governor and captain-general of the Rio de Plata.

Thus, with the aforementioned requirements, two proposals submitted to the Council of the Indies were rejected. However, a fortune seeker named Jaime Rasquí, or Rasquín, had fortuitously sailed from South America, and arrived back to Spain in January of 1557. Rasquín—a citizen from Valencia—had sailed with the first adelantado Don Pedro de Mendoza in 1535 to explore the Mar del Plata (Sea of Silver) and had spent over 20 years exploring and living in the lands around the Rio de Plata. It is recorded that in 1540 Rasquín even had a run-in with the famous Narvaez expedition survivor—Cabeza de Vaca, and then Governor of Rio de Plata—where an argument ensued and Rasquín threatened Cabeza, waving a multi-prong spear put to the governor’s chest.

With his experience and knowledge of the subject land, Rasquín was able to put together a consortium with his fellow and proud Valencians, who also desired to join other Spaniards in developing the Americas. With their financial help—along with his own family’s fortune—Rasquín was able to submit a viable proposal to the Council.

While the Rasquín plan was being considered, Doctor Pedro de Santander—spurred on by the reports of shipwrecks and the massacres of castaways—submitted a proposal to the Crown on July 15, 1557, which proposed a settlement at the Bay of Miruela (St. Joseph Bay) on the northern Gulf Coast of Florida for naval refuge. A larger settlement was to be situated at Ochuse, along with settlements in the interior in Indian lands, as well as a port on the Atlantic coast for protection of Spanish shipping from the marauding corsairs. All were to be connected by overland roads.

While Santander’s plan seems to have never proffered a response, major elements from the plan seem to have been quickly incorporated into another plan by the Council of Indies, which indirectly addressed the humane concerns of Santander. But that plan addressed the more important issue to the Crown of safeguarding the treasure fleets. Why only secure the South American ports when it was the seas of North America where the French corsairs were most active in their marauding upon the Spanish treasure fleets?

Thus, a master plan, or strategy, evolved within the Council of the Indies whereby there would be two expeditions in the New World in order to secure Spanish lands and protect the treasure fleets returning to Spain from the Indies. I call it The Grand Strategy.

The original planned expedition was destined to sail from Spain to South America with soldiers and colonists to secure the four settlements around the Rio de Plata, and the second added expedition would sail out of New Spain and establish a major port at Santa Elena located on today’s South Carolina Atlantic coast. That location was hoped to enable the Spanish to dominate the sea where all ships sailing to Spain from the New World left the currents of the Bahaman Channel along the east coast of la Florida, and immediately turned east to navigate across the warmer waters of the southern part of the North Atlantic. Control of the lands north and south of Santa Elena would make a voyage by French corsairs to prey on Spanish shipping physically more risky for the crews, which would be denied replenishment of fresh water and trade for food with the Native populations. Importantly, it would therefore be more financially risky for investors back in Europe who sponsored the corsairs, including King Henry II of France.

 

Implementation

Finally, on December 29, 1557, the king in the capitol city of Valladolid, Spain, issued a royal order, or cedula, commanding the viceroy in New Spain—Luis de Velasco—to recruit a God-fearing man who was zealous in royal service and who could lead the North American part of the newly developed “grand strategy” to secure the Indies. While such an individual would have to have the ability to help finance the expedition, the viceroy was to assist with what assets he could muster, which included taxes on commerce and the customary tributes of the native population that had continued after the Conquest by Hernando Cortez in 1521. Like the Luis Cancer missionary expedition of 1549 (which had been authorized by the king as the Prince), the expedition was to be totally implemented with New World assets. The soldiers and settlers were to be assembled from the Spanish and Creole populations found in the many provinces of New Spain.

The following day, December 30th, the Council of the Indies officially appointed Jaime Rasquín to assemble and lead the Valencia-based expedition to the Rio de Plata.       

The two expeditions—with the required ships, supplies, and peoples—were to be assembled in 1558 and early 1559 with a proposed sailing or target date of spring of 1559. By then the winter weather would have subsided in the North Atlantic Ocean and the heart of hurricane season still months away, minimizing the risks for both voyages.  

The cedula of the King to Viceroy Velasco in New Spain (today’s Mexico) probably arrived by a fast courier ship, or at least with the spring fleet in April of 1558. Velasco—after studying the Soto expedition—quickly began to put a plan in motion formulating all the details of his complex expedition as ordered. He officially nominated on October 30, 1558, an aging conquistador—Don Tristán de Luna of Oaxaca—to lead and help finance the very important settlement expedition to la Florida. Besides the destination port of Santa Elena on the Atlantic coast, Velasco also decided there would be two accompanying settlements. One would be established at the bay of Ochuse (Pensacola Bay) on the northern Gulf of Mexico where a port was to be established to easily and safely bring in supplies from New Spain. Another was to be planted midway between the two ports in the Indian lands of Coosa, and then blazing an overland road to Santa Elena. That plan would keep supply ships from having to sail the shoals of Florida and out into the Atlantic on their return voyage. Further, the Gulf of Mexico was still a Spanish Sea and offered protection from the corsairs, and also allowed for smaller and less complicated sailing vessels. Ultimately, a road from New Spain to the settlements was envisioned, whereby thousands of head of cattle could be driven overland. Such a road would eventually entail the establishment of numerous smaller settlements ensuring Spanish dominion of the interior.

On both sides of the Atlantic, the Grand Strategy was put in motion, with supplies, personnel, and the ships needed for transport being assembled.

Rasquín—from his homeport town of Valencia—acquired two urcas and one nao with the respective names of Jonás, Juan Baptista, and La Trinadad. Those ocean-going vessels were large enough to accommodate all the supplies, munitions, the required 600 men and their wives as well as any single women who wished to volunteer to travel. All were to help establish and populate a Spanish nation in and around the Rio de Plata. Rasquín was also authorized to take up to 12 secular clergy and 12 Franciscan friars. Eventually, ten Franciscans were chosen as well as a medical doctor and a pharmacist. By the royal instructions of October 1558, Rasquín and his investors had ten months to finish putting the expedition together.  

    Meanwhile, the expedition the viceroy in New Spain was putting together eventually included a contingent of 500 soldiers, a combination of 1,000 settlers and Aztec Indians, six Dominican frays, as well as 240 horses. It was said that the expedition would take along enough food to last one year as to avoid depending or imposing upon the Native populations for subsistence. To transport the Armada, eleven ships had to be assembled, including three barks specially built to navigate the shallow bays and rivers of la Florida, financed by the tax of the imposición, or Impost.

Also, while the Valencian expedition was sailing to existing settlements or known ports, it had been over 18 years since Francisco Maldonado—commanding the resupply ships of Soto—had visited what they believed to have been Ochuse. The viceroy had to confirm the actual location of the bay and geographical qualities of the land. This was all in order to make sure there was enough fresh water for a city as well as a suitable site to lay out a settlement. Each settlement had to have a large central plaza surrounded by 100 lots, with the lots divided up for a Royal House, or casa fuerte—a strong house for protection—a church, and commercial buildings for the merchants all affronting the plaza. This core of lots would be encircled by lots reserved for homesites for the settlers.

    On September 3, 1558, a reconnaissance expedition to search out the bay of Ochuse set sail from Veracruz under the command of Guido de las Bazares. The expedition sailed clockwise in the Gulf of Mexico and reached the northern Gulf Coast and did a thorough reconnaissance of what became Bahia Filipina—today’s Mobile Bay—but the expedition was unable to fight the easterly winds and rediscover Ochuse—Pensacola Bay. The failed expedition arrived back at New Spain on December 14, 1558.

    In response to this grave failure—and time becoming an issue—the viceroy immediately ordered another reconnaissance expedition led by men less fearless. A single ship sailed from Veracruz to Havana and up the west coast of Florida in a counter-clockwise manner—east to west—recording the coasts from Apalache in la Florida to New Spain. The military captain was Juan Renteria, who was accompanied by the pilot Gonçales Gayon. Renteria knew the coasts of la Florida having sailed with Maldonado in 1540 as part of the Soto expedition. It appears that Renteria and Gayon set sail in late December and quickly located the bay of Ochuse, accomplished exploration for a settlement site, and returned to New Spain within a few months. Gayon would eventually become the main pilot for all the communication and resupply missions to the Luna settlement at Ochuse. But importantly, the Spanish now knew exactly where they were going to sail and establish the first coastal port and settlement.

    Meanwhile, in Spain, after assembling at the port of San Lucar Barremeda—the primary coastal port for the departure and arrival of all vessels associated with the Indies—the Rasquín expedition was inspected and given final instructions. The small armada set sail for the Rio de Plata on March 14, 1559, and one half of the grand master plan for securing the Indies was underway.

    On the other side of the Atlantic, by May of 1559, all the ships of the Luna expedition had been readied and were waiting at the port of San Juan de Ulúa off the coast of Veracruz. The soldiers and colonists had first assembled in and around Tlaxcala in the first week of May, along with six Dominican frays. The frays were to accompany the expedition to assist in looking after the souls on the expedition, but also to hopefully proselytize and bring Christianity to the native population of la Florida. After a personal send-off by the viceroy, who had ventured to Tlaxcala, the expedition of over 1,500 people began their final trek toward embarkation at Vera Cruz. The Armada would set sail on June 11, 1559, which would set in motion the second part of the Grand Strategy of the Council of the Indies toward the peaceful settlement of la Florida; and more importantly, the protection of the treasure fleets returning to Spain from the Indies.

Main Sources

 

AGI. MEXICO 206, N.20.

AGI. Santo Domingo 11, ramo 3.

 

Andres de Barcia, Barcia’s History of Florida, translated by Anthony Kerrigan; introduction by Herbert E. Colton. University of Florida Press, Gainesville, 1951.

 

Campos i Vicens Genovés, El Valenciá Jaume Rasquín, Governador Del Pla, Segons La Ralació Del Seu Viatge Escrita Per L’Alferes Alonso Gómez De Santoya, Estudis Universitaris Catalans, ta Al Segle XVIInstitucio Patxot, Barcelona, Vol. XV, No. 2.

 

Herbert Ingram Priestly, The Luna Papers, Florida State Historical Society, Deland, Florida, 1928.

 

Robert S. Weddle, The Spanish Sea, The Gulf of Mexico in North American Discovery, 1500-1685, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, Texas, 1985.

 

Los Valencianos y America, Generalitat Valenciana, Valencia, 1992.

+ Article

 Abstract

The 1559 Spanish expedition led by Don Tristán de Luna was only one-half of a much larger plan to protect their treasure fleets from pillaging by French corsairs. Until now, that fact has never been recognized by historians. Indeed, the blackout of information King Philip II imposed upon his North American lands purposely hid the Luna expedition from the French and English for centuries, until Señor Barcia finally revealed the settlement effort in his 1723 History of Florida. Curiously, North American scholars have likewise been blind to the 1559 South American expedition that spawned the Luna expedition. Indeed, there was actually a two- continent plan developed by the Council of the Indies in the years 1556-1557 that was set in motion in 1558-1559. It appears that historians from both sides of the equator have treated the New World of the Western Hemisphere as practically being developed in two vacuums. But the evidence is overwhelming that in the 16th century the two continents of North and South America were more of a singular and fluid entity with Spanish peoples coming and going to both continents (as well as to Asia and the Philippine Islands) as one might easily travel to visit a distant cousin. The vastnesses of the newly explored oceans were not considered a hindrance, but simply a means of transportation.

The following discussion focuses on the previously “unknown origins” of the Luna Expedition relative to securing Spanish lands and protecting the treasure fleets in both North and South America.

 

The Beginnings

In 1556 the Holy Roman Emperor and King of Spain, Charles V, abdicated his thrones and his son Philip II became king solely of Spain. The wars by Charles V against the French and their Turkish and Moorish allies had drained the coffers of Spain, even though fleets of ships were bringing back tons of silver and gold from the New World. The mines of Potosi in Peru (now Bolivia), discovered in 1544, were producing the majority of silver and gold for Spain, but the overall Spanish population in that hemisphere was miniscule. The threat of Portuguese expansion in Brazil and French Huguenot intrusion into South America threatened Spanish control of those lands. Thus, in 1556, a plan or strategy evolved whereby South American mines and ports would be protected.

The plan developed by the Council of Indies comprised of a settlement expedition that would sail from Spain to South America with soldiers and colonists to reinforce and secure four settlements around the Rio de Plata (River of Silver), which empties into the Southern Atlantic Ocean in present-day Paraguay. Further, the Council sought to fortify the ports with expensive and accurate bronze cannons with all the necessary ammunitions. The expedition would also explore for more gold and silver all the way to the Straights of Magellan at the southern tip of South America, expand the production of sugar cane, and pacify the lands, especially the cannibals.

However, there was one important problem; the Spanish Crown was bankrupt and had no funds to implement such a plan. Thus, the Council of the Indies solicited public proposals in the first half of 1557 from private consortiums in Spain to finance and implement the desires of their king. Importantly, whoever headed the expedition would also be appointed the powerful positions of governor and captain-general of the Rio de Plata.

Thus, with the aforementioned requirements, two proposals submitted to the Council of the Indies were rejected. However, a fortune seeker named Jaime Rasquí, or Rasquín, had fortuitously sailed from South America, and arrived back to Spain in January of 1557. Rasquín—a citizen from Valencia—had sailed with the first adelantado Don Pedro de Mendoza in 1535 to explore the Mar del Plata (Sea of Silver) and had spent over 20 years exploring and living in the lands around the Rio de Plata. It is recorded that in 1540 Rasquín even had a run-in with the famous Narvaez expedition survivor—Cabeza de Vaca, and then Governor of Rio de Plata—where an argument ensued and Rasquín threatened Cabeza, waving a multi-prong spear put to the governor’s chest.

With his experience and knowledge of the subject land, Rasquín was able to put together a consortium with his fellow and proud Valencians, who also desired to join other Spaniards in developing the Americas. With their financial help—along with his own family’s fortune—Rasquín was able to submit a viable proposal to the Council.

While the Rasquín plan was being considered, Doctor Pedro de Santander—spurred on by the reports of shipwrecks and the massacres of castaways—submitted a proposal to the Crown on July 15, 1557, which proposed a settlement at the Bay of Miruela (St. Joseph Bay) on the northern Gulf Coast of Florida for naval refuge. A larger settlement was to be situated at Ochuse, along with settlements in the interior in Indian lands, as well as a port on the Atlantic coast for protection of Spanish shipping from the marauding corsairs. All were to be connected by overland roads.

While Santander’s plan seems to have never proffered a response, major elements from the plan seem to have been quickly incorporated into another plan by the Council of Indies, which indirectly addressed the humane concerns of Santander. But that plan addressed the more important issue to the Crown of safeguarding the treasure fleets. Why only secure the South American ports when it was the seas of North America where the French corsairs were most active in their marauding upon the Spanish treasure fleets?

Thus, a master plan, or strategy, evolved within the Council of the Indies whereby there would be two expeditions in the New World in order to secure Spanish lands and protect the treasure fleets returning to Spain from the Indies. I call it The Grand Strategy.

The original planned expedition was destined to sail from Spain to South America with soldiers and colonists to secure the four settlements around the Rio de Plata, and the second added expedition would sail out of New Spain and establish a major port at Santa Elena located on today’s South Carolina Atlantic coast. That location was hoped to enable the Spanish to dominate the sea where all ships sailing to Spain from the New World left the currents of the Bahaman Channel along the east coast of la Florida, and immediately turned east to navigate across the warmer waters of the southern part of the North Atlantic. Control of the lands north and south of Santa Elena would make a voyage by French corsairs to prey on Spanish shipping physically more risky for the crews, which would be denied replenishment of fresh water and trade for food with the Native populations. Importantly, it would therefore be more financially risky for investors back in Europe who sponsored the corsairs, including King Henry II of France.

 

Implementation

Finally, on December 29, 1557, the king in the capitol city of Valladolid, Spain, issued a royal order, or cedula, commanding the viceroy in New Spain—Luis de Velasco—to recruit a God-fearing man who was zealous in royal service and who could lead the North American part of the newly developed “grand strategy” to secure the Indies. While such an individual would have to have the ability to help finance the expedition, the viceroy was to assist with what assets he could muster, which included taxes on commerce and the customary tributes of the native population that had continued after the Conquest by Hernando Cortez in 1521. Like the Luis Cancer missionary expedition of 1549 (which had been authorized by the king as the Prince), the expedition was to be totally implemented with New World assets. The soldiers and settlers were to be assembled from the Spanish and Creole populations found in the many provinces of New Spain.

The following day, December 30th, the Council of the Indies officially appointed Jaime Rasquín to assemble and lead the Valencia-based expedition to the Rio de Plata.       

The two expeditions—with the required ships, supplies, and peoples—were to be assembled in 1558 and early 1559 with a proposed sailing or target date of spring of 1559. By then the winter weather would have subsided in the North Atlantic Ocean and the heart of hurricane season still months away, minimizing the risks for both voyages.  

The cedula of the King to Viceroy Velasco in New Spain (today’s Mexico) probably arrived by a fast courier ship, or at least with the spring fleet in April of 1558. Velasco—after studying the Soto expedition—quickly began to put a plan in motion formulating all the details of his complex expedition as ordered. He officially nominated on October 30, 1558, an aging conquistador—Don Tristán de Luna of Oaxaca—to lead and help finance the very important settlement expedition to la Florida. Besides the destination port of Santa Elena on the Atlantic coast, Velasco also decided there would be two accompanying settlements. One would be established at the bay of Ochuse (Pensacola Bay) on the northern Gulf of Mexico where a port was to be established to easily and safely bring in supplies from New Spain. Another was to be planted midway between the two ports in the Indian lands of Coosa, and then blazing an overland road to Santa Elena. That plan would keep supply ships from having to sail the shoals of Florida and out into the Atlantic on their return voyage. Further, the Gulf of Mexico was still a Spanish Sea and offered protection from the corsairs, and also allowed for smaller and less complicated sailing vessels. Ultimately, a road from New Spain to the settlements was envisioned, whereby thousands of head of cattle could be driven overland. Such a road would eventually entail the establishment of numerous smaller settlements ensuring Spanish dominion of the interior.

On both sides of the Atlantic, the Grand Strategy was put in motion, with supplies, personnel, and the ships needed for transport being assembled.

Rasquín—from his homeport town of Valencia—acquired two urcas and one nao with the respective names of Jonás, Juan Baptista, and La Trinadad. Those ocean-going vessels were large enough to accommodate all the supplies, munitions, the required 600 men and their wives as well as any single women who wished to volunteer to travel. All were to help establish and populate a Spanish nation in and around the Rio de Plata. Rasquín was also authorized to take up to 12 secular clergy and 12 Franciscan friars. Eventually, ten Franciscans were chosen as well as a medical doctor and a pharmacist. By the royal instructions of October 1558, Rasquín and his investors had ten months to finish putting the expedition together.  

    Meanwhile, the expedition the viceroy in New Spain was putting together eventually included a contingent of 500 soldiers, a combination of 1,000 settlers and Aztec Indians, six Dominican frays, as well as 240 horses. It was said that the expedition would take along enough food to last one year as to avoid depending or imposing upon the Native populations for subsistence. To transport the Armada, eleven ships had to be assembled, including three barks specially built to navigate the shallow bays and rivers of la Florida, financed by the tax of the imposición, or Impost.

Also, while the Valencian expedition was sailing to existing settlements or known ports, it had been over 18 years since Francisco Maldonado—commanding the resupply ships of Soto—had visited what they believed to have been Ochuse. The viceroy had to confirm the actual location of the bay and geographical qualities of the land. This was all in order to make sure there was enough fresh water for a city as well as a suitable site to lay out a settlement. Each settlement had to have a large central plaza surrounded by 100 lots, with the lots divided up for a Royal House, or casa fuerte—a strong house for protection—a church, and commercial buildings for the merchants all affronting the plaza. This core of lots would be encircled by lots reserved for homesites for the settlers.

    On September 3, 1558, a reconnaissance expedition to search out the bay of Ochuse set sail from Veracruz under the command of Guido de las Bazares. The expedition sailed clockwise in the Gulf of Mexico and reached the northern Gulf Coast and did a thorough reconnaissance of what became Bahia Filipina—today’s Mobile Bay—but the expedition was unable to fight the easterly winds and rediscover Ochuse—Pensacola Bay. The failed expedition arrived back at New Spain on December 14, 1558.

    In response to this grave failure—and time becoming an issue—the viceroy immediately ordered another reconnaissance expedition led by men less fearless. A single ship sailed from Veracruz to Havana and up the west coast of Florida in a counter-clockwise manner—east to west—recording the coasts from Apalache in la Florida to New Spain. The military captain was Juan Renteria, who was accompanied by the pilot Gonçales Gayon. Renteria knew the coasts of la Florida having sailed with Maldonado in 1540 as part of the Soto expedition. It appears that Renteria and Gayon set sail in late December and quickly located the bay of Ochuse, accomplished exploration for a settlement site, and returned to New Spain within a few months. Gayon would eventually become the main pilot for all the communication and resupply missions to the Luna settlement at Ochuse. But importantly, the Spanish now knew exactly where they were going to sail and establish the first coastal port and settlement.

    Meanwhile, in Spain, after assembling at the port of San Lucar Barremeda—the primary coastal port for the departure and arrival of all vessels associated with the Indies—the Rasquín expedition was inspected and given final instructions. The small armada set sail for the Rio de Plata on March 14, 1559, and one half of the grand master plan for securing the Indies was underway.

    On the other side of the Atlantic, by May of 1559, all the ships of the Luna expedition had been readied and were waiting at the port of San Juan de Ulúa off the coast of Veracruz. The soldiers and colonists had first assembled in and around Tlaxcala in the first week of May, along with six Dominican frays. The frays were to accompany the expedition to assist in looking after the souls on the expedition, but also to hopefully proselytize and bring Christianity to the native population of la Florida. After a personal send-off by the viceroy, who had ventured to Tlaxcala, the expedition of over 1,500 people began their final trek toward embarkation at Vera Cruz. The Armada would set sail on June 11, 1559, which would set in motion the second part of the Grand Strategy of the Council of the Indies toward the peaceful settlement of la Florida; and more importantly, the protection of the treasure fleets returning to Spain from the Indies.

+ References and Related Works

Main Sources

 

AGI. MEXICO 206, N.20.

AGI. Santo Domingo 11, ramo 3.

 

Andres de Barcia, Barcia’s History of Florida, translated by Anthony Kerrigan; introduction by Herbert E. Colton. University of Florida Press, Gainesville, 1951.

 

Campos i Vicens Genovés, El Valenciá Jaume Rasquín, Governador Del Pla, Segons La Ralació Del Seu Viatge Escrita Per L’Alferes Alonso Gómez De Santoya, Estudis Universitaris Catalans, ta Al Segle XVIInstitucio Patxot, Barcelona, Vol. XV, No. 2.

 

Herbert Ingram Priestly, The Luna Papers, Florida State Historical Society, Deland, Florida, 1928.

 

Robert S. Weddle, The Spanish Sea, The Gulf of Mexico in North American Discovery, 1500-1685, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, Texas, 1985.

 

Los Valencianos y America, Generalitat Valenciana, Valencia, 1992.

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